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TOUCHED BY TIME: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON DERRIDA’S 
ENGAGEMENT WITH MERLEAU-PONTY IN LE TOUCHER 
 
The philosophical relationship that obtains between the work of Merleau-Ponty and 
Derrida has continued to intrigue and preoccupy many of us despite, or perhaps even 
partly because of, the fact that Derrida did not accord the work of Merleau-Ponty 
much attention during his remarkably prolific career. Two relatively recent books of 
Derrida’s have addressed this gap: Memoirs of the Blind and, more recently, On 
Touching (hereafter OT)1. However, although Derrida proposes an “entire re-reading” 
of the later Merleau-Ponty in Memoirs of the Blind (see p52), with the clear 
implication that there are hitherto unaccessed and invaluable resources to be mined in 
this body of work, I will suggest that the actual reading of Merleau-Ponty propounded 
in On Touching falls well short of this ambition. While this essay will raise some 
critical questions about the interpretation that Derrida offers of Merleau-Ponty in 
‘Exemplary Stories of the Flesh: Tangent 3’, including the implication that his work 
on the senses and intersubjectivity remains mired in theological prejudices, it will also 
be concerned to examine the transcendental philosophy of time (or philosophy of the 
contretemps that breaks open time but nonetheless pertains to it) that undergirds and 
motivates Derrida’s engagement with the philosophies of touch. In this latter respect, 
I will argue that Derrida’s philosophy is itself ‘touched’ by time, in the peculiar sense 
of ‘touched’ that connotes affected and wounded. On my reading, his work 
instantiates an ethics of non-presentist time2 (an ethics of that time which is the 
                                                 
1See Derrida, J., Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins, trans. P. Brault & M. Naas, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993; and On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. C. Irizarry, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
2R. Bruzina describes Derrida’s work “less as anti-presentialism, i.e. asserting that presence has neither 
validity nor significance, than as countering presentialism, i.e. marshalling ways of indicating presence 
is not an absolute secured by own manifestness, but rather a kind of ‘constitutive’ result, the 
transcendental condition of the present, and any event of touch). I ask whether this 
prevarication on the issue of the transcendental and the ethical is reason to look for a 
different understanding of both time and the transcendental to Derrida’s, and I end 
this paper by proposing a dialectic between the disjunctive and conjunctive aspects of 
time (wound and scar3) that does not accord any kind of a priori privilege to the one 
over the other. 
 
TOUCHING THE UNTOUCHABLE: PHENOMENOLOGY AS HAPTOLOGY? 
 
First, however, let me briefly try to summarise On Touching. Aside from the detailed 
engagement with the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, On Touching offers a remarkable 
genealogy of the links between an optical intuitionism that has arguably undergirded 
large parts of modern Western philosophy and a less regularly observed 
haptocentrism that simultaneously grants a privilege to touch. In other words, Derrida 
argues that the ‘exorbitant privilege’ accorded to sight and optics is often also 
(perhaps inevitably) supplemented by a desire for presence (the intentional movement 
of desire) in which touching and the human hand play a foundational role. Whether he 
be analysing the work of Plato, Descartes, de Biran, Kant, Diderot, Berkeley, 
Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Chrétien, Frank, and others, according 
to Derrida there is never “any privilege for the gaze (no optical theoretism) without an 
                                                                                                                                            
‘constitution’ in this case being the paradoxical systematically unmanifestable play of ‘différancing’” 
(‘The Future Past and Present – and not just perfect – of Phenomenology’, Research in 
Phenomenology, Vol. 30, No. 1, p51-2). Despite Derrida’s suggestion in ‘Ousia and Gramme’ that 
perhaps there is no concept of time that is not metaphysical, his transcendental arguments for the 
necessity of something that interrupts presentist time, and that opens on to the past and the future, 
amount to something rather close to a non-presentist philosophy, or so I will argue in what follows. 
3As we will see in the context of his discussions of Merleau-Ponty’s work, Derrida’s reservations about 
any priority accorded to embodied coping revolve around the way in which its recuperative and 
binding component, based on habitual syntheses of time (e.g. the scar), covers over a certain structure 
of time that is considered to be both ontologically prior and ethico-politically more important (e.g. the 
wound of time: the immemorial past that nonetheless subsists, the future that defies our expectations 
and is the condition for the event). 
invincible intuitionism that is accomplished, fulfilled, fully effectuated, starting from 
a haptical origin or telos” (OT 204). To put it another way, Derrida argues that to 
varying degrees each of these thinkers remains a Christian ontotheologist, yearning 
for some kind of coincidence and a self-touching communion. The motif of the flesh 
employed by Merleau-Ponty, Chrétien, and others, is, for him (as for Deleuze and 
Guattari4), particularly symptomatic of this.  
It is important to note at the outset that, for Derrida, it is time that ultimately 
precludes and undermines this desire for coincidence, even though he only rarely 
directly states this in On Touching. Consider his comment: “the principle of intuition, 
finds itself threatened – as it happens to be, once again, by the experience of 
temporalisation that is indissociable from this” (my italics, OT 192). The ‘once again’ 
here evokes his earlier engagement with Husserl in Speech and Phenomena and the 
différance which interrupted the possibility of an exact internal adequation with 
oneself that Husserl’s phenomenology sought to secure. Indeed, Derrida’s recourse to 
a philosophy of time in order to undermine intuition (that phenomenological principle 
of principles) also parallels his claim in the same book that, “in the last analysis, what 
is at stake is… the privilege of the actual present, the now”5. In fact, it is arguable that 
all of Derrida’s most telling and repeatedly expressed objections about 
phenomenology are about time. He is concerned with the way in which time 
predominantly gathers in the phenomenological tradition, by the explicit or implicit 
reliance upon what he considers to be an untenable conception of the instant or ‘now’ 
                                                 
4In What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari make precisely the same comment about the concept of 
the flesh that features in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, describing it as a “pious” thought that “plunges 
into the mystery of the incarnation” – see p178). Despite Merleau-Ponty’s early Christianity and the 
problematic persistence of metaphors like ‘communion’ and ‘original ecstasy’ in his work (as Derrida 
shows), Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology is nonetheless problematic. 
See Reynolds, J., and Roffe, J., ‘Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty: Immanence, Univocity and 
Phenomenology’ (The Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology, Vol. 37, No. 3, October 2006, 
p228-51).  
5Derrida, J., ‘Speech and Phenomena’ and Other Essays on Husserl’s Theory of Signs, trans. D. 
Allison, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, p62-8. 
moment, as well as by the way in which ‘lived’ time almost inevitably forms a neat 
and unified continuum. This background is necessary in order to understand what is at 
stake in Derrida’s critical engagement with Merleau-Ponty. 
 
MERLEAU-PONTY AND THE SENSES 
 
After all, without doing Derrida’s analyses too great an injustice, his position can be 
schematically represented as follows: all philosophies of touch (and of the body) are, 
to greater and lesser extents, intuitionisms. They presuppose some kind of 
timelessness or immediacy in a given encounter/touch (self-presence), or they idealise 
such a situation as the infinitely deferred horizon towards which we can and should 
aspire. We can also generalise and say that on Derrida’s understanding all 
phenomenology, whatever its unarguable merits, amounts to a haptology, a 
philosophy of touch that privileges the hand (and therefore an intuitionism). As would 
be apparent from the conjunction of these two claims, Derrida likewise contends that 
Merleau-Ponty’s work is irremediably marked by both of these tendencies. Indeed, on 
Derrida’s analysis, at least as it is presented here, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
remains fundamentally committed to forms of presentism and to coincidence rather 
than non-coincidence (OT 211). In other words, the allegation is that his work 
harbours an omnipresent theological desire for union, something that for Derrida 
betrays itself in the later Merleau-Ponty’s deployment of the Christian notion of flesh. 
As a consequence of this guiding interpretative ambit, there are a few 
criticisms of Merleau-Ponty in On Touching that are rather ungenerous and which it is 
worth briefly recounting. Notwithstanding his recognition that there are aspects of 
Merleau-Ponty’s work that pull in contrary directions, Derrida’s basic position is that 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of ambiguity (and confusion) entails a valorisation of 
self-presence (OT 193, 198). Now, such a position omits to consider the constitutive 
role that time plays in Merleau-Ponty’s own arguments for ambiguity in 
Phenomenology of Perception (hereafter PP)6. Moreover, when Derrida rails against 
Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the confusion of the senses (OT 198), exemplified by his 
declaration that synaesthesia is the rule (PP 229), Derrida does not consider any of the 
surfeit of phenomenological and scientific evidence that, both before and since 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, has provided substantial support for 
such a position. Developmental psychology and cognitive analyses of neo-natal life 
continue to consistently point to an originary confusion and synaesthesia of the 
senses7.  
Now whether this constitutes an objection to Derrida depends upon one’s 
understanding of the nature of transcendental argumentation in general (and the 
manner in which Derrida himself deploys such arguments in relation to a privilege ge 
grants to that which breaks open time, to differance), since it seems tantamount to 
protesting that Derrida’s analyses of the transcendental are not empirical enough. 
Derrida might respond to such a reproach that there can be no concept of separate 
senses if they are originally confused in the manner Merleau-Ponty suggests. He 
might hence argue, modestly enough, that in order to be consistently thought, the 
                                                 
6Merleau-Ponty, M., Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith, London: Routledge, p345, 410-33.  
7The findings of much contemporary cognitive science, for example, suggest that the history of the 
tradition, and particularly phenomenology, far from being wrong, may have provided an account of the 
human congruent with both phenomenology, the findings of developmental psychology and neo-natal 
life. In particular, evidence suggests that there is an originary synaethesia of the senses, despite the fact 
that Derrida bemoans the philosophical explication of this ‘confusion’ or ambiguity in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work (OT 193). Similarly, even Derrida’s denigration of the privileged role given to the hand is at least 
partially redeemed when it is recognised that this may be ‘hard-wired’ into the human constitution – 
hand-mouth relations, for example, govern both foetal and neo-natal life, and arguably this priority is 
never wholly abandoned (for more on this, see Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Whether this justifies these philosophical traditions depends 
upon what one takes the task of a philosophy to be, but it is perhaps not overly surprising (and it may 
even be desirable) that phenomenology serve to explicate experiential structures that are likely to have 
concomitant (but irreducible) explanations in the cognitive sciences, developmental sciences, etc.   
senses must be distinguishable in principle, although this need say nothing about how 
the senses are experienced in fact, or even the conditions for such actual experience8. 
There is, after all, an important difference between what the literature refers to as 
concept-directed and truth-directed transcendental arguments9. If Derrida confines his 
analyses to the more modest ambitions of the former, without any deeper 
metaphysical/ontological connotations about the ways things really are, or the 
conditions of possibility for such reality/presence, then there is not necessarily a 
contradiction here between the findings of the empirical sciences and his 
transcendental analyses; on the contrary, it would make the former almost beside the 
point. Now that may be an unwanted consequence in itself, but I will show that 
Derrida deploys his transcendental arguments in both of these senses 
(genealogical/concept-directed and quasi-ontological). Because of this obfuscation, it 
seems to me that he does have a need to grapple with the empirical findings of the 
sciences to a greater extent than he does. While to question Derrida from such a 
perspective is not to invalidate his work, it does suggest that there are a conglomerate 
of reasons that may favour another approach, and it is also important to the issue of 
his relation to Merleau-Ponty because most of Derrida’s key disagreements with him 
tacitly depend on a disjunction between the transcendental and the empirical. As such, 
despite appearances, ‘Tangent 3’ actually offers a curious lack of actual engagement 
between these two philosophies, not least because the significance of the 
transcendental to their work (and the relation of the transcendental to the empirical 
findings of the sciences) lurks in the background as arguably the key point of dispute, 
but it is never foregrounded as such. 
                                                 
8Thanks to Jon Roffe for helping to clarify the significance of the transcendental to this dispute, and for 
proffering this likely reply.  
9See Robert Stern, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000, p10-11. 
He argues that truth directed transcendental arguments are ultimately problematic, relying on other 
question-begging assumptions, particularly either idealism or verificationism. 
But to return to Derrida’s problems with Merleau-Ponty, the latter is said to 
problematically put sight and touch on same plane (OT 186); there is hence a 
parallelism in Merleau-Ponty’s work (OT 200). Now any such parallelism is not 
logically entailed by the doctrine of synaethesia (a blurring of perceptual boundaries 
does not entail that we cannot meaningfully speak of sight and touch), and nor is it 
clear that Merleau-Ponty puts them on the same plane, despite some of the awkward 
apparent postulations of equivalence in Signs (hereafter S)10 that we will return to 
because they rightly catch Derrida’s attention. But Derrida also claims that Merleau-
Ponty relies upon a hierarchy of the senses (OT 206) and he says this specifically of 
The Visible and the Invisible. Derrida suggests that for Merleau-Ponty the first 
example remains the visible, but also that it is the hand that subsequently comes to 
dominate the discourse (grasping, pointing, touching: always of the human hand). But 
despite the title and the enduring motif of the two hands touching one another in 
Merleau-Ponty’s work, it is not as clear as Derrida thinks that any such 
‘handthropocentrism’ or ‘humannualism’ persists in The Visible and the Invisible 
(which we should note was originally titled ‘The Origin of Truth’). What about the 
role of music and sound, both of which are vital to Merleau-Ponty’s famous final 
chapter, ‘The Intertwining: The Chiasm’? Does the example of the (human) hand 
really drive the discourse for the entirety of this chapter as Derrida suggests (OT 
208)? Is this humanism itself an implicit theological remainder in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work? It seems to me that this must remain an open question, rather than something 
that is “hardly disputable” as Derrida declares at one point (OT 203).  
Of course, this does not vindicate Merleau-Ponty and offering a textual 
defence of Merleau-Ponty against Derrida’s interpretation is not the main purpose of 
                                                 
10Merleau-Ponty, M., Signs, trans. R. McCleary, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964.  
this paper in any case. It is more fruitful to acknowledge that these criticisms do touch 
on some substantive philosophical differences between Derrida and his predecessor 
that much of the remainder of this essay will be preoccupied with. These include: the 
allegation that Merleau-Ponty reduces the phenomena of touching to the hand and, 
therefore (on Derrida’s account), to the mastery of the ‘I can’; the suggestion that 
Merleau-Ponty’s embodied phenomenology privileges gathering and coincidence 
rather than non-coincidence and dispersal, and his argument that this becomes most 
apparent in what he considers to be Merleau-Ponty’s ‘intuitionism’ in regard to the 
other person. Both of these key criticisms relate to time. For example, in granting a 
primacy to pragmatic skills and equilibria within an environment (the ‘I can’ or motor 
intentionality of pre-reflective consciousness), for Derrida Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy presents a simplified account of touch not merely because it prioritises 
acts like grasping, but ultimately because it constitutes a philosophy of touch that 
brackets away the desire to touch and the injunction not to touch in favour of 
adjusting towards one’s environment. That is, it will be a philosophy of touch that is 
bereft of time, in that it will have been divested of the traces and residues of the past 
(that which tradition has forbidden us to do and which is thus promised above all 
else), along with the futural touch (the prospect of an event) which haunts and 
interrupts the stable order of time. Rather than the telos of touching being equilibria as 
Phenomenology of Perception at least seems to suggest, for Derrida it might be more 
accurate to say that it is the disequilibria that is bound up with the paradoxical desire 
to touch the untouchable (as with Levinas, desire is oriented around an exploration of 
the unknown). 
Now, at first glance Derrida’s implication that Merleau-Ponty’s account of 
touch is one without time seems somewhat disingenuous, especially given Merleau-
Ponty’s conception of the phenomenological reduction (history and social life cannot 
be bracketed away for a pure phenomenological analysis of touch), as well as his 
insistence on ambiguity in his early work, and reversibility in his later work. Both 
positions put time at the centre of sensibility and ensure that there is no touching that 
is unambiguously self-present. They form one part of his ontological argument that 
the experience of being touched, either previously or anticipated, encroaches and 
overlaps with the experience of touching – as does culture, even if they are based on 
proprioceptive capacities of bodies, such as the body-schema, that are, to some extent, 
pre-cultural, in that they are already apparent from the earliest stages of foetal life. 
Nonetheless, some important questions remain about the ‘I can’ of embodied life and 
the pre-reflective motor intentionality that is, at least to an extent, prioritised in 
Phenomenology of Perception (it is not so clearly the case in The Visible and the 
Invisible). Derrida’s basic problem, I think, is that this priority assumes a stability to 
the senses that has no role for the untouchable and the impossible. To put it another 
way, we might say that, for Derrida, touching is far too complicated to account for 
under the schematics of the pre-reflective body preparing to grasp or point to an 
object – and, we might note in passing, the phenomenological distinction between 
grasping and pointing has engendered much Merleau-Ponty-inspired research in the 
cognitive sciences and other disciplines11. On Derrida’s characterisation, sense-
certainty is precisely that for Merleau-Ponty – certain – rather than penetrated or 
wounded by the desire to touch and the injunction not to touch. Derrida’s fundamental 
argument in On Touching is that there is no touch without the wound of time 
                                                 
11See, for example, Gallagher, S., How the Body Shapes the Mind, Dreyfus, H., & Dreyfus, S., ‘The 
Challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment for Cognitive Science’ in Perspectives 
on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture, eds. H. Haber & G. Weiss, London: 
Routledge, 1999, and Kelly, S., ‘Grasping at Straws: Motor Intentionality and the Cognitive Science of 
Skilled Behaviour’, in Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 2: Heidegger, Coping and 
Cognitive Science, eds. Wrathall, M., and Malpas, J., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 
(dispersal, différance). This is another way of saying that there is no touch without the 
impossible and the untouchable, noting that the impossible term of the aporia is 
consistently associated with the past and the future. For Derrida, the past and the 
future, desire and repression, saturate the senses in such a manner that they are not 
assured and confident, but, more likely, stuttering and tentative, in a manner that is 
closely related to Deleuze’s valorisation of the trauma of apprenticeship in Difference 
and Repetition12. The senses are affected such that they are in disarray rather than in 
relatively harmonious interaction and functioning as an integrated whole, as is 
presupposed by much of Merleau-Ponty’s early phenomenology, arguably even when 
he is considering ‘abnormal’ cases like Schneider and the experience of phantom 
limbs in order to shed light on what is presupposed when the body is inconspicuous or 
‘transparent’ to us.  
There are, however, some things that perhaps ought to be said in Merleau-
Ponty’s defence here. Notably, what about what we might call the sexual-schema, 
which functions by transposition (PP 168) and substitution (PP 78), unlike the body-
schema which functions by proprioception (crudely, our pre-reflective sense of our 
body)? Our proprioceptive capacities and their movement towards establishing an 
equilibrium within a given environment are never self-sufficient; rather they are 
always allied with and supplemented by the sexual schema, including desire for 
others, the unknown, etc. (PP 165). This is why Merleau-Ponty says existence is 
suffused with sexuality (PP 159) but nonetheless is not reducible to it (PP 166, 169). 
Arguably, this divests Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the body of the assumption of 
‘properness’, which Derrida is so worried about. We will return to this point in the 
context of the purported lack of introjection in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, 
                                                 
12Deleuze, G., Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994. Also, see Reynolds, J., “Deleuze and Dreyfus on l’habitude, coping and trauma in skill 
acquisition”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4, December 2006, p563-83.  
something which also greatly concerns Derrida, but suffice it to say that in sexuality 
(understood in the broadest sense) the body is dispossessed, in that desire is 
experienced through a series of substitutions13. 
Nonetheless, let us grant to Derrida that such aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s work 
are not given as much attention as the discussions of the body-schema and our pre-
reflective attempts to secure equilibria through the establishment of habits, ‘maximum 
grip’, intentional arcs, skills, etc. Confronted with this disparity, it is a difficult 
question as to how to decide between these perspectives. Surely Merleau-Ponty’s rich 
analyses of the body compellingly show us our flexibility and adaptability. Likewise, 
it is difficult to deny that phenomenologically there is an integrity and unity to 
perception that empiricism has been unable to adequately countenance, and that 
intellectualism has falsified in giving the pre-eminent constituting role in this unity to 
reflective judgment, as in Merleau-Ponty’s famous and influential critique. There is 
also an important phenomenological distinction between pointing and grasping, and 
between the reflective and the pre-reflective, that it seems that Derrida wants to 
problematise. But one would not want to simply give these up without some good 
reasons or fairly compelling counter-evidence. On what basis then, can Derrida 
overturn or subtly displace the force of this analysis?  
Derrida’s point here as elsewhere is that phenomenology covers things over. 
Something resists or elides phenomenological analysis, notably a certain trace and a 
certain traumatism. What kind of argument is this? It is a transcendental one, 
grounded in all of his prior attempts to show that différance is the condition of 
possibility of presence, and also renders that ‘presence’ unstable and liable to 
                                                 
13These observations are partly indebted to Gayle Salamon. Her paper ‘The Sexual Schema: 
Transposition and Transcendence in Phenomenology of Perception’, delivered at the International 
Association of Philosophy and Literature, Cyprus, 2007, reminded me of these aspects of Merleau-
Ponty’s work that have partly been forgotten due to Judith Butler’s critique of his chapter on sexuality 
for its unproblematised assumption of gender neutrality. 
transformation – hence his early use of the phrase ‘quasi-transcendental’. To be more 
accurate, it is simultaneously a transcendental and a genealogical argument that 
Derrida provides us with (again, ‘quasi-transcendental’). As Derrida shows us in On 
Touching, when we speak of tact, for example, it is a matter of knowing how to touch 
on the untouchable, which cannot be a matter of simply touching it (OT 67). Can a 
phenomenology of perception tell us anything about tact, Derrida’s rhetorical question 
seems to be? And without this, can a phenomenology of touch really have anything to 
say about the concept of touch, perhaps even the experience of touch? What if tact is 
involved in all touching, such that the sense of touch is problematised by the 
untouchable, the cultural and symbolic? These are, I think, important questions. In 
fact, Derrida is surely right in this regard, but it is not clear that Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy (even his earlier phenomenology) is committed to disputing this. For him, 
the phenomenological reduction functions by showing us its impossibility, by 
showing us our ties to the world, history and time. Moreover, the embodied attempt to 
secure an equilibrium – we adjust our gaze to observe something appropriately, to get 
maximum grip – need not be committed to reducing all touch to this kind of 
teleological activity. On the contrary, we have seen that the sexual schema functions 
in a very different way. The point is just that it is a basic modality of being-in-the-
world, and the onus is on Derrida, I think, to provide an argument as to why it should 
be relegated to secondary status, replaced by a philosophy of the prosthetic rather than 
a philosophy of the body (cf. OT 237). As an aside, we might note that the prosthetic 
can also be seen as central to Merleau-Ponty’s analyses in the exploration of phantom 
limbs and the manner in which cars, glasses, etc., become part of an expanded body-
schema. Despite Derrida’s strong criticisms then, it seems that there are many aspects 
of Merleau-Ponty’s work that elide his analysis, and that indicate that it is still not 
clear that all philosophy’s of the body must be premised upon a haptical intuitionism 
and implicitly theological, yearning for some form of communion with nature, world, 
or God. To put it another way, the fact that philosophies of the body 
(phenomenological and otherwise) have often been problematic in the ways that 
Derrida indicates does not show that their considerations are either philosophically 
unimportant or that they should instead be consigned to the lesser term of a dualism 
(e.g. as a present, empirical state of affairs, in contrast to the transcendental condition, 
the contretemps that breaks open the present toward the past and future).  
Moreover, some further questions about the Derridean strategy remain to be 
asked. For Derrida, these intriguing discussions surrounding tact and the paradoxical 
desire to touch the untouchable are again largely motivated by his concern for the 
event and for the new. Consider On Touching, where Derrida cites Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
declaration that “the impossible is what takes place”. Derrida responds: “Madness. I 
am tempted to say of this utterance, itself impossible, that it touches on the very 
condition of thinking the event. There where the possible is all that happens, nothing 
happens, nothing that is not the impoverished unfurling of the predictable predicate of 
what finds itself already there, potentially, and thus produces nothing new” (OT 57). 
Derrida’s language here is strong: where the possible is all that happens nothing 
happens, except the “impoverished unfurling of the predictable predicate”. There is 
the event, there is the new: these are of the order of the impossible (conceptually 
speaking), but they are also what can and must motivate us (experientially speaking) 
as Derrida insists in so many different places in his later work. What is the status of 
this kind of transcendental argument? It is not clear, being simultaneously conceptual, 
metaphysical/ontological (e.g. the disruptive time of the event is a condition of the 
possibility of presence) and ethical. Is this opposition between the event and the 
predictable predicate a necessary one, either conceptually or for the possibility of 
experience per se? Derrida says it is a condition of thinking the event, but is this really 
the only manner in which one can account for, or think, the event, and what gives this 
manner of thinking the event a privileged ethical role? Is every philosophy of 
mediation, of continuums, condemned to be unable to explain the event? It is not at all 
clear that this is so. Presumably ‘tipping points’ can still be theorised. Moreover, if 
the event can only be thought on the basis of such an abstraction (the event vs. the 
predictable predicate), as Derrida suggests, then such a thought would, having little to 
do with the experiential and not rigorously transcendentally grounded, arguably be 
metaphysical. 
This does not, of course, prove Derrida wrong, but is it not the case that the 
body (including the body-schema) is itself a condition of possibility of both 
experience and the enunciation of such transcendental arguments? In such a 
formulation the boundaries between the empirical and the transcendental are clearly 
blurred, but it is curious that Derrida does not consider this possible path. On the 
contrary his position (event vs. predicate) seems to inexorably come from Levinas’ 
rejection of the ‘imperialism of the same’ and is, arguably, a defining feature of 
poststructuralism. Certainly this logic is evident in the thought of Deleuze: consider 
his material, in Difference and Repetition, on the apprentice and the child-player who 
can only win. Derrida employs an analogous logic in relation to the event of touch. 
For there to be an event of touch it must, paradoxically, involve the impossible: 
touching the untouchable. As I have noted, there is a conceptual logic to this position 
that is compelling, but what remains to be explained is the priority that the 
untouchable and the impossible continue to enjoy in Derrida’s work in both an ethical 
and a transcendental sense (beyond that of being a mere necessary condition for 
conceptual thought). And why is it, by contrast, that the recuperative capacities of 
bodies (habits, skills, etc.) and their ‘omni-temporal time’, as Derrida refers to them in 
Politics of Friendship14, remain devalued, with virtually no attention paid to them? 
This question is never really answered in Derrida’s work, although it is tacitly 
assumed that there are ethical considerations in favour of his position. Let us broaden 
our inquiry then, in order to see the ethical and inter-subjective significance that 
might be accorded to Derrida’s transcendental philosophy of time. 
 
TOUCHING THE UNTOUCHABLE OTHER 
 
After all, bound up with his aporetic analyses of touching the untouchable, is also the 
problem of the other (whether person or non-person). For Derrida, the problems of 
time and the other are inter-related15, and it is hence unsurprising that he also takes 
Merleau-Ponty to task for his conception of inter-subjectivity along essentially 
Levinasian lines16. For Derrida, Merleau-Ponty’s view too often domesticates the 
other’s essential untouchability, making of them an analogue of our own flesh and 
positing a communion without divergence (écart): Merleau-Ponty “runs the risk of 
reconstituting an intuitionism of immediate access to the other… runs the risk of 
reappropriating the alterity of the other more surely, more blindly, or even more 
violently than ever” (my italics, OT 191). This is curious language for Derrida, this 
                                                 
14Derrida, J., Politics of Friendship, trans. G. Collins, London: Verso, 1997, p16, 20.  
15Derrida, J., Adieu to Emmanuel Lévinas, trans. P. Brault & M. Naas, Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1999, p52. 
16In both “Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty” and “Sensibility”, Levinas criticises Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy for being an imperialism of the same, and for being sustained by an unaccountable 
affection. While Levinas accepts Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of reversibility as they pertain to an 
individual touching themselves while touching another object – he describes it as a “remarkable 
analysis” – he is critical of the extending of this type of reversibility on to the alterity of another 
person. See Levinas, E., “Intersubjectivity: Notes on Merleau-Ponty” and “Sensibility” in Ontology 
and Alterity in Merleau-Ponty, eds. G. Johnson & M. Smith, trans. M. Smith, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1990. 
repeated ‘runs the risk’ that is also in the French original17. It is not as careful as he 
usually is, and its lack of rigour perhaps testifies to the uncharitability of his reading 
of Merleau-Ponty. It conveniently ignores that Merleau-Ponty explicitly targets all 
philosophies of intuition in The Visible and the Invisible in a chapter entitled 
‘Interrogation and Intuition’. Perhaps even more significantly, Derrida never mentions 
two key inter-related ideas that preoccupy the entirety of this book, chiasm and 
reversibility, an enumeration of which would surely threaten to undermine his 
argument. In fact, the textual support that Derrida brings forth to justify his 
interpretation is based almost exclusively on the essay, ‘The Philosopher and his 
Shadow’ (from Signs). Although this makes sense given Derrida’s attempts to show 
how Merleau-Ponty has misread Husserl (and in this respect Derrida is surely right), it 
is curious that he devotes such cursory consideration to the ontology of The Visible 
and the Invisible18.   
Fundamentally, Derrida contests Merleau-Ponty’s account of relations with 
others because of the way that Merleau-Ponty says that we have them immediately 
and without introjection. Derrida cites and italicises Merleau-Ponty’s comment about 
the phenomenological apprehension of the other: “It is imperative to recognise that 
we have here neither comparison nor analogy, nor projection nor ‘introjection’” (S 
168). For Derrida, this entails “an intuitionism of immediate access to the other” (OT 
191), and it is this immediate phenomenological access to the other person ‘without 
introjection’ that Derrida is worried about. As Derrida suggests:  
If there is some introjection and thus some analogical appresentation starting 
at the threshold of the touching-touched, then the touching-touched cannot be 
accessible for an originary, immediate, and full intuition, any more than the 
                                                 
17See Derrida, J., Le Toucher: Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Galilée, 2000), p218.  
18The last couple of pages of the pivotal chapter, ‘Tangent III’, do, however, give the ‘Working Notes’ 
for this book some attention. 
alter-ego. We are here within the zone of the immense problem of 
phenomenological inter-subjectivity (of the other and of time): … shouldn’t a 
certain introjective empathy, a certain ‘inter-subjectivity’, already have 
introduced an other and an analogical appresentation into the touching-touched 
for the touching-touched to give rise to an experience of the body proper 
allowing one to say, ‘it is I’, ‘this is my body’? (OT 176-7).  
Derrida suggests here that there is some analogical appresentation at the heart of the 
touching-touched, and at the heart of the seeing another, or touching another. The 
technical, the prosthetic, is installed at the heart of the purported pure intuition of 
bodily apprehension, something akin to what Derrida elsewhere refers to as the 
‘prosthesis of origin’19, but let us think a little further about what this might involve, 
why we should believe it, and its relationship to the positions that Merleau-Ponty 
holds. How, for example, does an “introjective empathy” become an “analogical 
appresentation”? Are these equivalent as Derrida’s comments seem to suggest? It 
seems to me that the former need not entail the latter, and that certain argumentative 
premises are missing here.  
We should also note that when Merleau-Ponty says “without ‘introjection’” in 
the passages that so trouble Derrida, the term introjection is persistently placed inside 
quotation marks suggesting that it has a particular meaning that is not obvious. 
Indeed, when Merleau-Ponty uses the terms shortly afterwards, it is in the context that 
projection and introjection are understood representationally and to be opposed to the 
pre-reflective. Merleau-Ponty says, “I can think that he thinks; I can construct behind 
this mannequin a presence to self modelled on my own; but it is still myself that I put 
in it, and it is then that there really is ‘introjection’” (S 169). His real target here hence 
                                                 
19Derrida, J., Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Mensh, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1996.  
seems not to be introjection loosely understood, but arguments by analogy that 
depend upon some kind of representation of the other and that are premised on 
reflection and abstraction.  
For him, of course, there is an overlapping between self and other, a 
transitivism between self and other, which must occur developmentally and even in 
adult conversation with another. We continue to “borrow ourselves from others” and 
to “create others from our own thoughts” (S 159), and his philosophy is hence 
premised upon a minimal introjection and projection, if we understand those terms to 
refer merely to the manner in which self and other are relationally constituted, both 
developmentally and phenomenologically. Merleau-Ponty consistently draws 
attention to the way in which newborn babies are able to imitate the facial expression 
of others, both in Phenomenology of Perception and in his essay, ‘The Child’s 
Relations With Others’20, something that provides the basis for our relations to others 
thereafter. As Thomas Fuchs notes in this context, “by the mimetic capacity of their 
body, they transpose the seen gestures and mimics of others into their own 
proprioception and movement”21. There is much evidence for this ability to put 
ourselves virtually in the place of another22, be they a person or perhaps even the 
environment as is suggested by Merleau-Ponty’s famously enigmatic remark in ‘Eye 
and Mind’ about the trees looking at us. Certainly there is, as Fuchs suggests, a virtual 
modelling of our motor-schema in response to the other’s expressions. In his words, 
“the body works as a tacitly ‘felt mirror’ of the other. It elicits a non-inferential 
process of empathic perception” in this transfer of corporeal schema. On one level, it 
                                                 
20See Merleau-Ponty, M., ‘The Child’s Relations with Others’, trans. W. Cobb, Primacy of Perception, 
ed. J. Edie, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.  
21Fuchs, T., “Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in 
Melancholy and Schizophrenia”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 2005, p98. 
22Meltzoff, A., and Moore, K., ‘Imitation in newborn infants: Exploring the range of gestures imitated 
and the underlying-mechanisms’, Developmental Psychology, Vol. 25, 1989, p954-62.  
is hence to difficult to see what the force of Derrida’s objection might be. On 
Merleau-Ponty’s account, the other is there from the ‘beginning’ (as Derrida would 
want), whether through the sexual schema that is co-present with the body-schema, or 
through this virtual modelling of the other that is nonetheless immediate and non-
inferential.  
Merleau-Ponty’s concern with the narrower and more technical understanding 
of ‘introjection’, however, seems to be with the way in which it connotes a distinct 
inner and outer, where a subject replicates in itself behaviours of others in the 
surrounding world (this is perhaps the analogical appresentation that Derrida invokes, 
but might this not be said to be incorporation rather than imitative and pre-reflective 
introjection?23) This sometimes happens, of course, but Merleau-Ponty’s point in this 
passage is that there must be a prior overlapping and encroachment (a chiasm, not a 
union) for this to be possible, exemplified in this instance by the non-inferential 
relations between self and other that obtain from birth, and there is an ongoing 
exchange between self and other. For Merleau-Ponty, this is both a transcendental 
argument and it is also simultaneously said to be phenomenologically given (on his 
analysis) and susceptible to scientific analysis (science may not ultimately prove or 
disprove his transcendental hypothesis, but it does lend weight to it). This becomes 
clearer in the second half of the passage that Derrida discusses, where Merleau-Ponty 
goes on to say: “On the other hand, I know unquestionably that that man over there 
sees, that my sensible world is also his, because I am present at his seeing, it is visible 
in the eyes’ grasp of the scene. And when I say that he sees, there is no longer here (as 
there is in ‘I think that he thinks’) the interlocking of two propositions but the mutual 
                                                 
23Again, however, Derrida would contest any too easy distinction between incorporation and 
introjection. See, for example, “Fors: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok”, 
trans. Johnson, in The Wolfman’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy, Abraham, N., & Torok, M., trans. 
Rand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986. 
unfocusing of a ‘main’ and a ‘subordinate’ viewing” (S 196). The other person exists 
for us before the order of thought, but that is not necessarily to say without the 
mediations of culture which also has a pre-reflective weight.  
What might Derrida contest in this? Is Derrida suggesting that there can be no 
distinction between motor intentionality (or the so-called pre-reflective) and reflective 
analogical thinking at all, between introjection and incorporation (analogical 
appresentation)? Or is he just calling into question the ability of a reflective activity 
like philosophy to describe this pre-reflective aspect without falsifying it? If he 
subscribes to the latter, then we should note that for Merleau-Ponty the perceptual 
faith is described precisely as a paradox, and it is a paradox that he gives a lot of 
attention to via his notion of a ‘hyper-dialectic’24 – the key point, however, is that the 
philosopher cannot simply return to this faith. Derrida is hence correct to point to the 
description of the pre-reflective as a difficulty for any philosophy of touch, but he 
does not address the manner in which Merleau-Ponty himself grapples with this 
question, and does not understand the pre-reflective faith as something that is simply 
given to us. On the other hand, it also sometimes seems that Derrida’s insistence that 
there is analogical appresentation at the heart of all experience is an attempt to contest 
this distinction between the reflective and the pre-reflective. But this move seems 
implausible and there is little to support Derrida’s intermittent declarations in this 
regard, and certainly not phenomenological evidence. In this text it is almost an axiom 
for Derrida, the consequence of various different transcendental arguments deployed 
throughout his career that are the background to this declaration. Nevertheless, it 
should not be ignored that it is a position that remains disjunct from experience and 
bodies, from phenomenology, developmental psychology, and cognitive science, 
                                                 
24See Merleau-Ponty, M., The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A. Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964, p28. 
among other disciplines. Derrida might accept this as something akin to a badge of 
honour, but from a Merleau-Pontyian perspective it means that Derrida remains an 
intellectualist who privileges reflection, what Merleau-Ponty calls a ‘high-altitude’ 
thinker (VI 69). Perhaps the prices for accepting Derrida’s view are too high to pay, at 
least without tinkering at the edges and making deconstruction a little more pragmatic 
by insisting on the import and value of lived time but without reifying it. That, at 
least, is my tacit proposal here: a transcendental pragmatics of an embodied variety, 
rather than either the Derridean ‘quasi-transcendental’ or the Habermasian discourse 
ethics variety. 
Now none of this is to suggest that Derrida doesn’t correctly point out 
problems with several of Merleau-Ponty’s formulations regarding the other, but the 
point remains that they are taken out of context because the major arguments being 
propounded by these formulations – e.g. chiasm/reversibility, the reflective and pre-
reflective distinction – are not explicitly considered. For example, when Derrida (like 
Levinas) seizes on Merleau-Ponty’s claim that, “I see that this man over there sees, as 
I touch my left hand while it is touching my right” (my italics, S 170; OT 197), his 
problem here is with the ‘as’ that suggests the relation between my left hand touching 
my right hand is the same as that which obtains when I shake another’s hand (or see 
another person, etc). These apparent declarations of equivalence are problematic, but 
focusing on them also misses Merleau-Ponty’s key point. Both Merleau-Ponty’s ‘as’ 
and his ‘in no different fashion’ (S 168; OT 190) denote a structural isomorphism that 
obtains (the chiasm, reversibility) phenomenologically, and apparently neuro-
biologically25, but this does not entail that every chiasm and every reversibility is 
                                                 
25Recent analyses of brain functioning likewise suggest that bodily self-awareness and the perception 
of others share very closely related neurobiological functions. See Fuchs p103, and Mlakar, J., 
Jensterle, J., and Frith, C. ‘Central Monitoring Deficiency and Schizophrenic Symptoms’, 
Psychological Medicine, Vol. 24, p557-64.  
equivalent. Merleau-Ponty repeatedly shows this is not so. The gap between touching 
and being touched in our own perceptual experiences of our body is not the same as 
that which obtains with touching or seeing others (there is a phenomenological 
difference that nobody could deny), but Merleau-Ponty’s claim is that the former gap 
(écart) and intertwining (these come together for him), does “prepare” ourselves for 
the understanding that there are others26. Merleau-Ponty explicitly says this in ‘The 
Philosopher and his Shadow’ (S 168), but Derrida does not mention it despite 
focusing on this passage. Preparation is not equivalence. While it is difficult to 
dispute that Merleau-Ponty’s language sometimes betrays an impulse towards some 
kind of intuitionism of the other (and, as Derrida points out, it is also significant that 
religious images of ‘communion’, ‘original ecstasy’, etc. abound), this is clearly an 
unsympathetic reading of Merleau-Ponty being propounded here. The question then is 
why. While we cannot, of course, know precisely what motivated Derrida, nor “what 
makes reading Merleau-Ponty so troublesome” for him, so “passionately exciting and 
difficult, yet also disappointing or irritating” (OT 211), we are now in a position to at 
least venture a tentative hypothesis based upon the tacit argumentative premises of 
Derrida’s own text.  
Rather than it being the case that Merleau-Ponty’s work is insufficiently 
deconstructive and remains tethered to theological and humanist prejudices, it is more 
accurate to observe that Derrida’s work is touched by a transcendental philosophy of 
time in a way that Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is not. Or, to put it another way, there 
is something akin to what Husserl might call a transcendental pathology in Derrida’s 
philosophy, an anti-presentism that eschews the time of Chronos, the orderly 
succession of presents in linear time, the habitual certitudes of the senses (including 
                                                 
26This point is well explored by James Hatley in his essay, “Recursive Incarnation and Chiasmic Flesh: 
Two Readings of Paul Celan’s ‘Chymisch’” in Chiasms, eds. F. Evans & L. Lawlor, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000, p237. 
commonsense). Despite their seeming incompatibility, Derrida accords both a 
transcendental and ethical privilege to a certain wound of time that he has given 
various names – différance, trace, etc. – and that recently has resulted in arguments 
problematising stable friendship (cf. Politics of Friendship), embodied equilibria (the 
‘I can’), and any purported stability that we accord to the sense of touch and the 
senses more generally. It is difficult to dispute Derrida’s forceful analyses of the co-
imbrication and contamination that time institutes. Nonetheless, because of the 
manner in which his transcendental arguments sometimes appear concept-directed, 
sometimes metaphysically or ontologically directed, a certain subterfuge takes places 
that renders both the findings of the sciences redundant, and that allows an ethical 
priority to be accorded to but one aspect of time, the disjunctive and the wounding 
(the past and the future: although they are not themselves present, they are the 
condition of presence). Derrida’s arguments toward the ethical conclusion almost 
invariably beg the question. Just as Derrida accuses Merleau-Ponty of preferring 
coincidence to non-coincidence (presentism to non-presentism) despite Merleau-
Ponty’s protestations to the contrary (OT 211), it seems to me that Derrida makes the 
reverse mistake. While Derrida’s transcendental philosophy emphasises the necessary 
intertwining of coincidence and non-coincidence more thoroughly than, say, Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s does, it is nonetheless the case that the time of dispersal is ethically 
prioritised because of its links to the event (understood as rupture, as outside of the 
order of possibility). But the fact that the body excludes things from our particular 
horizons of significance with its habits and recuperative capacities that involve an 
omni-temporal binding that covers over gaps and aporias (without suggesting that 
they are not there) is not something that ought to be ignored. Likewise, the failure to 
consider the evidence that other disciplines help to provide for many of Merleau-
Ponty’s positions is problematic, despite Derrida’s attempt to dress the decision up in 
transcendental terms. For me, it remains an unjustified leap of faith, and one which at 
least partly explains his enduring unease with the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
